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Background: Homeland security measures increasingly affect urban life and activities. Standoff distance, which
prevents unscreened vehicles from approaching within a certain distance of a building, is a widely applied measure
when protecting buildings against attacks with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. This measure both is
rather inexpensive and has few negative externalities when implemented in rural areas. Unfortunately, sites with
protection needs often are situated in city centres.
Methods: We apply the so-called Security Function Framework to illuminate the externalities or the ‘troublesome
trade-offs’ between protecting a high-value site against vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and protecting
other urban values.
Results: This paper demonstrates that standoff creates challenges for other important values, such as functional office
spaces for all employees, deliveries and emergency vehicle access. Simultaneously, standoff creates opportunities for
reinforcing social-responsibility requirements, such as accessibility for pedestrians and environmental considerations.
Conclusions: Security measures can have both negative and positive externalities and planning might alleviate some
of the negative ones.
Keywords: External effects; Design conflicts; Contradictions; Security; Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices;
Standoff distance measures; City centres; Holistic securityBackground
On 22 July 2011 at 3:17 pm Anders Behring Breivik left
a vehicle-borne explosive device in the government com-
plex of Norway. The bomb detonated at 3:25 pm, killing
eight people and destroying three government buildings
(The Public Prosecutors 2012). A reduced presence of
government employees (it was late Friday afternoon and
the holiday season), together with the fact that no building
collapsed, limited causalities. The amount of damage did,
however, induce the government to examine the possi-
bility of redeveloping the government complex to enable
the majority of the ministries to move into it in future
(Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2013).
Following the bomb attack on the government complex,
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in any medium, provided the original work is pimprovised explosive devices (VBIED) has increased dras-
tically, both when protecting the current buildings and
when planning the future government complex (FGC).
Current practice for protecting buildings against such
attacks is to combine measures that strengthen the build-
ing and its facade with a standoff around the building
(Ettouney et al. 1996). Since the effect of a bomb decreases
exponentially with distance from the bomb, a standoff
that creates distance between a potential explosive and a
building is a very effective measure (Cormie et al. 2009;
Gebbeken et al. 2012).
Creating standoff in rural areas where land is cheap
and available is relatively inexpensive and easy. Unfortu-
nately, many buildings with protection needs are situated
in city centres where land is expensive and annexation of
land can have major disadvantages for the building’s users,
its neighbours, and other members of the public. The pur-
pose of this paper is to identify and explain the variousn Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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appropriate, to propose possible solutions to such di-
lemmas. We do all three by employing the ‘The Security
Function Framework’ (SFF), as formulated in Ekblom
(2012), in the case of the FGC of Norway. The FGC of
Norway is an example of a multifaceted project that
requires protective security while being situated in a city
centre where land is scarce.
Ekblom (2005) introduces the term ‘troublesome trade-
offs’ when describing the potentially conflicting re-
quirements which must be considered by the designer.
Conflicting requirements include values such as aesthet-
ics, legal and ethical issues, environmental considerations,
safety, convenience, cost, and social inclusion (Ekblom
2005, 2012). The pursuit of security involves handling
many such troublesome trade-offs, including that security
may suspend normal democratic freedom in zones of high
security and that security dictates that we should distrust
others (Zedner 2003). CCTV, for example, can encourage
social inclusion by increasing perceived safety (Loukaitou-
Sideris 2006), while also facilitating discriminatory prac-
tices and can thus cause social exclusion (Sætnan et al.
2002). Security may even replace public spaces with
private spaces, such as the case of gated communities.
Paradoxically, such private security may reduce public
order by removing the responsibility of the inhabitants for
the “outside” (Lemanski 2004).
Gebbeken et al. 2012 argue that since a free demo-
cratic society will never accept a surveillance state, we
need passive security measures, such as innovative and
architecturally attractive buildings and landscape ele-
ments. Such measures, however, also entail troublesome
trade-offs. Khajehpour and Grierson (2003) demonstrate
that high-rise office buildings ‘designs with the most
profit potential and those with the most safety potential
correspond to buildings that also are the least safe and the
least profitable, respectively’ (Khajehpour and Grierson
2003). Coaffee et al. (2009) discuss the visual impact of
counter-terrorism security measures. Visible security fea-
tures ‘tell’ the public that a place can be used safely, while
potential offenders ‘are ‘told’ that their malign intent is
likely to be in vain or at least will require a significant
degree of effort’ (Coaffee et al. 2009). Security features
can, however, also increase fear by drawing attention to
the fact that security is necessary for protection (Zedner
2003; Coaffee et al. 2009; Lemanski 2004).
Gamman and Thorpe (2007) discusses trade-offs be-
tween providing bicycle parking and terrorism preven-
tion and argue that monitored long-term parking can
both reduce bicycle thefts and prevent bicycle bombs,
while providing short-term bicycle parking that does not
allow for bicycle bombs might be more challenging.
They do, however, argue that removing bags from
bikes (rather than bikes) should, in most cases, sufficientlyaddress the risk of terrorism (Gamman and Thorpe 2007).
Armitage and Monchuk (2009) explore conflicts and syn-
ergies between security and sustainability of housing. To
facilitate robust and effective security which does not
incur unnecessary costs, Little (2004) calls for holistic
security where interactions between government officials,
security professionals, program and financial staff, and
emergency responders occur regularly, rather than on a
project-by-project basis. Better planning before construct-
ing buildings with protection needs would also enable us
to solve many troublesome trade-offs.
Ekblom and colleagues have developed a four-level
framework, the SFF, for describing a product’s ‘security
function’. This framework was constructed with the
purpose of describing both the rationale that underlies a
crime-resistant design and the immediate output of the
‘design-against-crime’ process (Ekblom 2012). The SFF
can be briefly summarized (Ekblom et al. 2012; Ekblom
2012):
– Purpose – what the designed product is for,
including both security and other requirements.
– Niche – how the security function of a given
product relates to other security arrangements.
– Mechanism – how the product’s security function
works in terms of cause and effect.
– Technicality – how the product is constructed and
manufactured and how it operates.
Ekblom (2012) distinguishes between different pur-
poses: (1) the principal purpose, which may or may not
be one of security, (2) subsidiary purposes, (3) desire
requirements that are beneficial to the immediate
users and manufacturers, and (4) ‘hygiene’ or social-
responsibility requirements, referring to other societal
values which the product should not interfere with.
Work within the Design against Crime Research Centre
has contributed to this framework and two projects were
especially relevant: The Bikeoff project, whereby parking
stands and other facilities were developed to be secure
against bike theft (Thorpe et al. 2012), and the Grippa
Clip, which addressed preventing theft of customers’ bags
in bars through specially designed anchoring clips to fit on
tables (Ekblom et al. 2012). Meyer and Ekblom (2012),
furthermore, did a desktop test of the SFF by using it to
specify design requirements of an explosion-resistant
railway carriage. They concluded that the framework
was clearly expressed, facilitated structured creativity,
and was seemingly quite practically applicable (Meyer and
Ekblom 2012).
The above studies use the SFF to spell out the design
of relatively contained products. The FGC of Norway is
a more complicated and multifaceted product. It will
contain government functions that are essential for the
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ated in a dense city-centre area and its features will
impinge on all the numerous neighbours and city-centre
visitors. The FGC will therefore have some impact on
many equally essential values. Hence, this study asks:
Can the SFF be successfully employed in the case of the
FGC of Norway? And will the framework help illuminate
the ‘troublesome trade-offs’ when constructing a new
government complex? We reformulate the three assess-
ment criteria employed in Meyer and Ekblom (2012): 1.
The terms employed in the SFF should also be easily
employed in the FGC (clearly expressed); 2. The SFF
should support the users of the framework in exposing
additional troublesome trade-offs (fertile); and 3. It
should help users to produce relevant solutions to the
troublesome trade-offs (practically applicable).
The next section describes the information-collection
process used in the study discussed in this paper. Sec-
tion three employs the SFF in the FGC: (1) the purposesFigure 1 The city centre of Oslo. The circle encompasses the area whereof the FGC, (2) the security niche of the FGC, (3) the
mechanism behind protecting against VBIED attacks,
and (4) some technicalities of implementing standoff.
Section three also outlines the troublesome trade-offs
between implementing standoff and achieving other pur-
poses of the FGC. Finally, section four assesses the per-
formance of the SFF in analysing the FGC, and section
five concludes the paper.
Method
The case of the FGC of Norway is interesting because it is
rare that a new government complex is planned in such a
dense area of a city (see Figure 1). The government com-
plex in Berlin is the nearest example case the authors
know of, but in that case the city had lots of free space
owing to the removal of the Berlin Walla. The procedural
requirements of a large public-procurement exercise in
Norway also make it easier to examine the motivations
and the justifications behind all the choices for the FGC.the government complex will be situatedb.
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the concept study for the FGC (Minken et al. 2009). The
quality assurance was carried out autumn 2013 and win-
ter 2014, and the quality assurance report was presented
to the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform
and Church Affairs February 2014. As part of this
process, we interviewed relevant stakeholders on their
perspectives concerning the complex. The interviews
were all semi-structured (Leech 2002) and always con-
ducted by at least two interviewers (for some interviews
even three or four interviewers). The interviewers took
notes and these notes were compared after the inter-
views. All these interviews were confidential, so we can-
not refer specifically to any particular one (or produce
direct quotes) when we discuss the issues raised in
the interviews. We have, however, included a list in the
Table 1 of all the interviews that at least one of the authors
participated in (Berntsen et al. 2014).
In addition to the interviews, we conducted a docu-
ment analysis of relevant policy documents, such as the
mandates for the concept study and the quality assur-
ance, the concept study, and other publicly available
sources (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013; Ministry of
Government Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs
2012, 2013).
After finishing the quality assurance of the concept
study, we collected relevant academic literature and
employed the SFF on the information collected through
the quality assurance process.Table 1 Interviews conducted as part of the quality assurance
Date Topic(s)





07.10.13 Accessibility for emergency vehicles
08.10.13 Accessibility, public transport
09.10.13 Space requirements, security
10.10.13 Accessibility for emergency vehicles
10.10.13 Security
18.10.13 Implementation strategy, costs, security
18.10.13 Planning process, accessibility, the urban environment
24.10.13 Special needs SMK
25.10.13 Security, emergency planning, costs
30.10.13 Security, emergency planningResults
The security function of the FGC
This section presents the results of employing the SFF in
the FGC of Norway. The FGC involves a vast number of
stakeholders, including everything from the city of Oslo
to the small corner store in the neighbourhood, but this
paper lacks space to examine all stakeholders’ perspec-
tives. The discussion below, therefore, pays particular
attention to the Norwegian authorities’ perspective and
deals only with other stakeholders’ perspectives when
official government documents explicitly refer to their
interests.
Purpose
According to the mandate for the concept study (Minis-
try of Government Adminstration, Reform and Church
Affairs 2012), a new government complex must be pre-
pared to provide a long-term solution for [functional]
premises for the majority of the ministries. The mandate
for the quality assurance is more specific; it says that
‘the majority of the ministries’ implies significantly more
than half of the ministries (Ministry of Government
Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs 2013). Both
mandates specify that the ministries should be located in
the area for many decades to come (Ministry of Govern-
ment Adminstration, Reform and Church Affairs 2012,
2013). Since the FGC will be designed to provide func-
tional premises for the ministries, this purpose can be
referred to as the primary purpose of the FGC.where at least one of this article's authors participated
Organisation
Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs
Statsbygg
Norwegian Police Security Service
Norwegian National Security Authority
National Police Directorate Norway
Norwegian Defence Estates Agency
Agency for Fire and Rescue Services, City of Oslo
Ruter AS (common management company for public
transport in Oslo and Akershus)
Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation
Ambulance and Paramedic Department, Oslo University Hospital
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
Statsbygg
Vice Mayor of Urban Development, City of Oslo
Agency for Planning and Building Services, City of Oslo
Agency for Urban Environment, City of Oslo
Office of the Prime Minister
Ministry of Justice and Public Security
Emergency Planning Agency, City of Oslo
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must satisfy necessary requirements for both flexibility
and security. The premises must be flexible enough to
handle changes in both the ministerial structure and the
working methods, and must satisfy necessary security
requirements (Ministry of Government Adminstration,
Reform and Church Affairs 2012, 2013). These purposes
(about flexibility and security) are not what the FGC is
designed for, but they describe properties of the FGC that
are so crucial that they can be referred to as subsidiary
purposes.
Interviews with relevant stakeholders have also uncov-
ered some other requirements for the FGC: the FGC
should be ‘representative’. By ‘representative’ they we
mean that the FGC must favourably project Norway and
the Norwegian government. The buildings should be well
designed, on the outside and inside, and should be mag-
nificent without being too grand to represent Norwegian
identity and culture. The ‘representative’ requirement is a
desire requirement, because it is not strictly necessary, but
nevertheless is a nice-to-have feature for the Norwegian
government.
Inherent in any concept study and quality assurance of
large public projects are calculations of the investment
cost. This cost focus shows that minimizing expenses
also is a desire requirement. Minimizing running costs,
such as heating, maintenance, and surveillance, is prob-
ably also a desire requirement.
The mandates also mention some requirements that
refer to other societal values. These values include traffic
flow and environmental requirements for the buildings
(Ministry of Government Adminstration, Reform and
Church Affairs 2012, 2013). According to the SFF, ‘hy-
giene’ or social-responsibility requirements should not
be unnecessarily interfered with. The FGC of Norway
will be situated in the middle of Oslo’s city centre and
will have a very large impact on the whole area. Some
might therefore argue that the FGC should preferably
reinforce, rather than avoid interfering with, other soci-
etal values, such as accessibility, openness and environ-
mental considerations.
After the concept study was released in June 2013, a
big debate arose regarding preservation of some of the
older government buildings. The Directorate of Cultural
Heritage, therefore, did their own study (with a mandate
from the Ministry of Environment) of the preservation
value of these government buildings. It concluded that
two of the buildings the concept study recommended
for demolition were of very high preservation value (The
Directorate of Cultural Heritage 2013). The debate and
the sudden ordering of the new study demonstrate that,
even if not mentioned in the mandates, preservation also
is a societal value that the FGC should not unnecessarily
interfere with.The 2014 draft budget of Oslo City Council states that
Oslo City Council will be working towards providing
safe and secure public spaces. The Council has therefore
established a safety index based on the police’s crime
statistics and annual surveys of the population (Oslo
City Council 2013). Safety from both deliberate and acci-
dental harm is, accordingly, another societal value the
FGC should reinforce or, at a minimum, avoid interfer-
ing with.
Vibrant Oslo (Levende Oslo) is a project whose aim is
to increase the activity in the city centre (City of Oslo
2014). Activity in public space depends on the presence
of some attractive characteristics, including accessibility,
aesthetics and safety (Gemzøe 2006). In addition, people
use public space when they either are passing through
or have a destination situated in the area (e.g. street ven-
dors, entertainment centre or public transport). Most
visitors to the area, whether on business or sightseeing,
will travel there because they are intending to visit the
ministries. But to ensure activity outside office hours,
the area will need after-hours attractions. Will a buffer
zone paralyze all other activities in the area or could it
help reinforce activity by offering other visitors some-
thing to do?
Security niche
The security niche characterizes how the security func-
tion relates to other security-related products, people
and places (Ekblom 2012). But before describing a secur-
ity niche of the FGC,c a more thorough look at the risks
the government complex faces is necessary.
The government complex comprises functions, em-
ployees and material values, all of which need protection
from a broad range of risks. The concept study mentions
intentional acts, such as crime, intelligence gathering,
terrorism and sabotage, and other unwanted incidents,
such as fire, water damage, and loss of electricity or
power. In addition, the study formulated seven absolute
security requirements that indicate some risks its authors
considered important (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013,
p. 75) [authors’ translation]:
1. That there be a minimum of 20 meters from general
vehicle traffic to government buildings, a distance
requirement that must be increased to 40 meters for
those parts of the government complex containing
national functions that are either especially critical
and/or under heightened threat (infrastructure).
2. That the construction of buildings be undertaken in
line with specific principles.
3. That there be resistance to attacks using improvised
charges whether transported or carried.
4. That there be no physical contact between
government buildings (controlled area) and private
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absent or less than 5 meters, appropriate safeguards
must be implemented.
5. That the possibility of shooting be minimised by
limiting the view into the buildings.
6. That there be individual safeguarded pathways
for critical infrastructure and separate transport
routes for trade and logistics staff.
7. That the facades be surveillable.
The first three absolute security requirements deal
mainly with explosive attacks. Security requirement num-
ber 1 (standoff) has been imposed to counter a vehicle-
borne threat, probably primarily to counter a VBIED
threat, such as the case of the Breivik bombing of the old
government complex, but it could also help impede other
vehicle-borne attacks (e.g. using a vehicle as a ram). Secur-
ity requirement number 2 has been imposed such that the
buildings should be able to withstand large explosions.
Security requirement number 3 has been imposed to
counter smaller explosions that might also occur inside
buildings.
The next three absolute requirements deal with more
diverse threats. Security requirement number 4 counters
hostile intelligence and other intrusions. Security require-
ment number 5 counters assassinations, as well as hostile
intelligence. Security requirement number 6 counters any
misdeeds against critical infrastructure, whether for hostile
intelligence gathering, contamination, or cutting of the
infrastructure, and impedes smuggling of unwanted mate-
rials and unwanted intrusion. Security requirement num-
ber 7 supports the detection of all illegitimate behaviour.
The FGC is thus exposed to significant threats, threats
that it must be protected from. The FGC will therefore
be protected by separate security products and securing
products. A security product’s main purpose is to
protect the FGC (Ekblom 2012). Examples of security
products include bollards, fire alarms, and CCTV. A
securing product is one that has a subsidiary (secondary)
purpose (protecting the security of the government
complex, that is, securing the government complex) in
addition to whatever its principal purpose is (Ekblom
2012). Landscaping might be considered a securing prod-
uct, for example.
Using security and securing products to protect the
government complex makes for a secured complex, pro-
tected by external means. But incorporating security or
securing products or incorporating deliberate security
adaptations can make the government complex an in-
herently secure one (Ekblom 2012). For example, a
blast-resistant window is a securing component with the
principal purpose to admit light while protecting against
the weather, and the subsidiary purpose to protect
against blast effects. An example of a deliberate securityadaptation is to use structural redundancy to protect the
complex and its inhabitants in case of a bomb attack.
Standoff (which is the focus of the rest of the paper) is
another example of a security adaptation that protects
against all vehicle-borne threats.
Mechanism
The causal mechanisms describe how the design
intervention works by interrupting, diverting or weak-
ening a security threat (Ekblom 2012). The design of
the FGC will contain a vast number of causal mecha-
nisms for intervention against security threats. This
study is, as mentioned previously, limited to VBIED
attacks.
One way of indicating causal mechanisms in relation
to offender purposes is to identify crime scripts. A crime
script is a description of the procedural sequence a criminal
goes through when committing a specific type of crime.
By spelling out the actions (and their goals) necessary
to complete the crime, the crime script can ‘enhance
situational crime prevention policies by drawing atten-
tion to a fuller range of possible intervention points’
(Cornish 1994, p. 159-160). Meyer (2011) developed
crime scripts for an offender crashing a VBIED into a
railway sites. The first crime script describes an offender
parking a VBIED (Meyer 2011, p. 314-315):
1. Find suitable spot for crashing vehicle into carriage
without being spotted or challenged.
2. Remove any physical obstacles without being
spotted or challenged.
3. Arm device and await the right moment without
being spotted or challenged.
4. Crash into site while detonating the explosives.
Meyer (2013, p. 4-5) has formulated a more detailed
crime script of the offender parking a VBIED:
1. Devise outline plan:
i. Establish desired outcome (scale of death/
destruction/publicity);
ii. Establish likely target locations (Clarke and
Newman 2006)d.
2. Perform reconnaissance without being detected:
i. of suitable area(s) for leaving a vehicle-borne
device (including parking restrictions, parking
enforcement, normal parking activity, physical
security, closed-circuit television, and any blast
enhancing factors).
ii. of transport route(s) into suitable area.
iii. of escape route(s) from suitable area.
3. Decide upon the most appropriate modus operandi
(probably only two main options):
i. Time delay device (long or short);
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(co-terminus = suicide)).
4. Gather detailed information to support modus
operandi:
i. from personal contact;
ii. from printed materials (books, newspapers, etc.);
iii. from the Internet;
iv. from first principles.
5. Locate suitable base from which to launch attack:
i. one’s own property;
ii. a friend’s property;
iii. a rented property;
iv. a derelict/ownerless property.




7. Obtain suitable explosive materials/precursors




iii. homemade from purchased or stolen precursors.
8. Obtain information about how to assemble a device:
i. Purchase or steal necessary materials;
ii. Purchase or steal necessary tools;
iii. Assemble device.
9. Obtain vehicle and other tools for transport and
containment of explosive device without being
detected.
10. Transport vehicle to target without being spotted
or challenged or explosives being detonated by
accident.
11. Find suitable spot for the explosive(s) and
(if necessary) for nearby viewing point for
detonation - without being spotted or challenged.
12. Remove any physical obstacles at detonation site
without being spotted or challenged.
13. Arm device and leave vehicle without being spotted
or challenged.
14. Leave area or go to viewing point.
15. Detonate device if command initiated (e.g. radio or
telephone controlled) without being spotted or
getting injured from explosion.
Both above crime scripts highlight the need for finding
a suitable site. A standoff that creates distance between
an accessible spot and the target decreases the effect
from the explosion upon the intended target and thus
reduces the benefit of attacking. Crime participants seek,
however, to overcome the defences of their adversaries
(Felson 2006). Instead of just accepting the reduced bene-
fit of attacking, the attacker might thus adapt; whetherabandoning the attack entirely, attacking another target
(target substitution), or choosing a different attack mode
(Meyer 2013). A standoff would, for example, protect
against vehicle-borne explosives, while not being able to
prevent any attack with a person-borne explosive.
The technicalities section below discusses the technical
requirements for such standoff.Technicalities
Describing the technicalities is primarily a task for future
planning, but already now it is possible to set some ‘per-
formance standards’ for the standoff (or buffer zone) be-
tween general vehicle traffic and the FGC.
The required distance between the perimeter bound-
ary and the FGC depends on many variables. These in-
clude the threat level, that is, how much explosive force
security experts estimate that the attacker will be able to
generate, the importance and the quality of the site
which must be protected, the buildings’ resilience to
blasts, and what sort of consequences we deem accept-
able in case of a VBIED attack.
In addition to the distance requirements, the perim-
eter boundary must be able to withstand the maximum
speed a vehicle can reach at the perimeter. The maximum
speed depends on the surrounding areas. How is the road
system constructed? Can a vehicle use the roads to ac-
celerate straight towards the boundary or will the road
system force the vehicle to slow down? Speed reduction
measures around the buffer zone, such as bumps and
curved roads, can therefore reduce the maximum force
the perimeter boundary must withstand.
The width between obstacles must, furthermore, not
be greater than 1.26 meters (Forman et al. 2009). If some
vehicles are to have access to the buffer zone, access
control is necessary. Electronic keys are a relatively easy
and inexpensive way to manage such access control, but
unmanned gates are vulnerable to tailgating (sneaking a
car in behind a legitimate user) and keys may go astray
and are susceptible to hacking. For this reason, a guarded
gate is probably more secure. However, such a gate must
have protection that can withstand an accelerating vehicle,
and turning space for vehicles denied access (a rejection
line). The guards must also be protected to minimize the
possibility that they will be threatened or forced to open
the gate.Troublesome trade-offs
The above section shows why the FGC of Norway needs
a standoff (buffer zone) between the government com-
plex and general vehicle traffic. This measure has, how-
ever, more consequences than intended by the measure
and we refer to these consequences as externalities. This
section accounts for these externalities and compares
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any ‘troublesome trade-offs’.
Principal purpose
The principal purpose of the FGC is to provide long-
term, functional premises for the majority of the minis-
tries, that is, the FGC must provide necessary space for
functioning ministries. The area available for building
the FGC is limited in extent. The quality assurance re-
port of the concept study demonstrated that if the FGC
is to accommodate all the ministries for more than 50
years, the area must be densely developed (Berntsen et al.
2014). Using space for buffer zones leaves less space for
development and makes it even more necessary to build
denser and taller buildings in the remaining area, and can
make the FGC a less long-term solution.
For a fully functional government complex, all legitim-
ate users, such as employees and visitors, need reason-
ably easy access. Introducing a buffer zone will make it
more difficult, if not impossible, for many users to access
the FGC by care. Figures 2 and 3 displays two suggested
government complexes where the government buildings
are marked in red and dashed lines mark the streets
which the concept study recommends should be closed
off for general vehicle traffic. Figure 2 shows a reused
version of the old government complex, while Figure 3
shows the current plans for the future government com-
plex (Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013). However,
given the environmental policy objective to reduce ve-
hicle traffic in the city centre, such an obstacle might be
positive. If legitimate users end up choosing to travel by
public transport, to walk, or to cycle, such a buffer zone
will contribute to fewer carbon emissions. Such an exter-
nality might thus be called a positive externality.
Some legitimate users may have disabilities that make
them dependent on motorized vehicles. To ensure that
they also have access, both the outdoor areas and close-
by public transport must be inclusively designed.
A fully functional government complex requires deliv-
eries. An external commodity reception where all items
are inspected before they are forwarded to the govern-
ment complex in security-cleared vehicles may ensure
that deliveries do not compromise the buffer zone. This




The concept study for the FGC formulated, as men-
tioned, the requirement that all government buildings
should be situated a minimum of 20 meters from gen-
eral vehicle traffic. For those parts of the government
complex containing national functions that are either
especially critical and/or under a heightened threat, therequired distance increases to 40 meters. A distance
requirement which distinguishes between two levels of
security, where the ‘strict’ requirement of 40 meters will be
employed for only a small part of the government complex,
makes for a relatively flexible government complex, where
most of the ministry function can be rearranged and/or
moved within the complex. In other countries, the distance
requirement varies more. For example, in Berlin, the au-
thorities distinguish between three threat levels for govern-
ment buildings. Only the three buildings with threat level 1
(Bundestag, Bundeskanzleramt, and Bundesministerium
des Innern) have a required distance of a minimum of 50
meters to general vehicle traffic, and no streets have been
closed off to general vehicle traffic outside other govern-
ment buildings (Metier, OPAK, LPO 2013). Differentiation
between government buildings lets the city keep more
streets open, but also makes the use of the government
buildings less flexible in case of changes in the ministry
structure. A possible solution to this dilemma is to install
flexible barriers that close off streets only when govern-
ment functions that need the protection are located close
to streets with general vehicle traffic.
Security purpose
A standoff between the FGC and general vehicle traffic
is a security measure aimed at vehicle-borne attacks.
Such attacks are relatively rare in the Western world,
but the consequences can be significant should they suc-
ceed. On a daily basis, other hazards, such as accidents
and ordinary criminal incidents, can be more acute.
In case of a life-threatening incident, emergency vehi-
cles need quick access to the area. A buffer zone might
delay such quick access. Good procedures to alert the
guards so they can be prepared to open the gates might
decrease such delays. Some incidents may also involve
blocked gates (for example caused by collapsed build-
ings). To ensure emergency-vehicle access in such inci-
dents, the buffer zone must have multiple access points.
In case of fire, the fire department must have access
for all their cars to all major ‘fire attack paths’ (often the
main entrance and stairways), with a maximum distance
of 50 meters. In addition, the ground must be able to
withstand the load of heavy fire engines and associated
supporting jacks.
The FGC will have visitors that need extra security.
For such visitors, waiting for access at the external per-
imeter may cause heightened risk of personal attacks. A
gate to admit visitors with extra security needs must
therefore be constructed to prevent personal attacks.
Desire requirements
Representativeness
The prime minister and other ministers regularly receive
visitors from home and abroad and it is important for
Figure 2 The reused version of the Norwegian government complex with streets closed for general vehicle traffic (dashed lines)
(Metier, OPAK, LPO arkitekter 2013).
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Figure 3 The planned Norwegian government complex with streets closed for general vehicle traffic (dashed lines) (Metier, OPAK,
LPO arkitekter 2013).
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that the Norwegian government emerge with a culturally
representative government complex. This requirement
of representativeness applies to both inside areas and
outside areas. How will the removal of almost all motor-
ized vehicles influence the representativeness of the out-
side areas?
Streets with general vehicle traffic dominate outdoor
areas in the city centre. However, motorized vehicles are
banned in some areas, such as pedestrian streets and
park areas, thus providing greater design freedom for
those planning and designing the outdoor areas, and
creating opportunities for spaces that are more visually
pleasing. Consequently, a buffer zone that excludes mo-
torized vehicles will probably increase the representa-
tiveness of outdoor areas.
A buffer zone around the government complex must,
as mentioned, be protected by barriers along the perim-
eter. Such barriers can be ugly, such as blocks of con-
crete, or pretty, such as reinforced planters. To ensure
the representativeness of the government complex, these
barriers should be designed to increase the attractiveness
of the outdoor areas rather than being ugly obstacles in
the urban landscape.
Cost
A buffer zone will, all things being equal, increase the
size of the FGC and thus increase its construction costs.
However, a buffer zone will reduce other security costs
related to protecting against VBIED attacks. For example,
a large standoff will reduce the required structural redun-
dancy in buildings and thus reduce investment cost. Lack
of a standoff would also force security to continuously
monitor all areas with vehicle access close to the FGC and
thus significantly increase security-related running costs.
‘Hygiene’ or social-responsibility requirements
Even if social-responsibility requirements are mentioned
last on the SFF’s list of purposes, the location of the FGC
in a densely built city-centre area, affecting a vast number
of neighbours and travellers, makes social-responsibility
requirements very salient. Different stakeholders, such
as different governmental authorities, also disagree about
which requirements are more important.
Accessibility
A buffer zone that excludes general vehicle traffic will
obviously impede ordinary motorists travelling into or
through the government complex. However, given the
environmental policy objectives to reduce car traffic in
the city centre, reduced motorized traffic can also be
positive. Some vehicle-access issues are, however, more
salient than others. If a buffer zone causes emergency-
service response times to neighbours of the governmentcomplex to be too long, compensatory measures must
be implemented.
Commerce depends on deliveries. If a buffer zone
interferes with deliveries to neighbourhood commercial
businesses, alternative routes must be established. Some
commodities may also be transported without using a
motorized vehicle.
Public transport, both underground and surface trans-
port, is an essential part of a vibrant city centre. Some
public transport modes are underground, such as the
regular railway and the Oslo Metro, while others require
space on the surface and, thus, might be impeded by a
buffer zone. In Oslo city centre, both tram and bus lines
require surface space, and while current tram lines by-
pass the area designated for the FGC, conflict over a bus
route which originally passed through the government
complex has already arisen. Even one bus route through
a buffer zone creates specific security challenges: a bus is
easy to obtain on the open market and could be turned
into a giant bomb disguised as a regular vehicle. In ad-
dition, public transport depends on predictable condi-
tions, and would suffer if heightened readiness were to
cause disruptions in the regular schedule.
Removing motorized vehicles frees space, providing
more space for other road users, such as pedestrians and
cyclists. Motorized vehicles might also limit vulnerable
road users’ mobility by being a ‘threat’ to them. Thus, by
reducing accessibility for motorized vehicles, such a buf-
fer zone, might increase accessibility for pedestrians and
cyclists.
Environmental considerations
Removing vehicles will, as mentioned, have positive
environmental effects by encouraging a shift to more
environmentally friendly transport. In addition, the buffer
zone can be planted and thus provide green spaces for the
densely built city centre.
Preservation
The Ministry of Environment emphasizes that cultural
heritage is an important resource that must be protected
and expanded even while cities are transforming. In
other words, the conservation value of older structures
must be considered when redeveloping the city. A chal-
lenge with using older buildings for government pur-
poses is that they often are less space efficient than
newer purpose-built structures. Keeping old structures
will therefore have to be compensated for by increasing
the outdoor space needed to build the FGC (Berntsen
et al. 2014).
External security needs
For common citizens either travelling through the FGC
or just spending time in outside areas, other risks might
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against the government complex. For example, the risk
of robbery and/or rape might make citizens choose
against using outside areas at night. Jane Jacobs’ concept
of eyes on the street claims that movement through an
area will create natural surveillance (Jacobs 1961), and
since criminals do not generally wish to be observed or
apprehended, such surveillance can prevent crime. Intel-
ligently designed landscape and lighting can promote
natural surveillance from the interior of a building and
from the exterior by neighbours and passers-by (Cozens
2002). Car occupants, cyclists, and pedestrians can func-
tion as eyes on the street, and if reduced driving through
the area is compensated for by increased cycling and
walking, natural surveillance need not be diminished. It
is, furthermore, likely that slow road users in the open
have a greater preventive effect than do passengers trav-
elling fast inside a vehicle.
The FGC will, as mentioned, face a wide range of risks.
The Government Administration Services will therefore
employ CCTV surveillance in their effort to handle these
different risks. This monitoring capacity can also be
employed to detect crimes against citizens, such as rapes
and robberies. If security personnel interrupt detected
crimes and/or the information is used in subsequent
investigation and prosecution, such CCTV can serve to
increase the overall security of the protected area and to
provide more security for general citizens using outdoor
areas. Use of this measure is likely to more than com-
pensate for any reduced security caused by excluding
vehicles.
Having fewer cars in the buffer zone will initially re-
duce encounters between vulnerable road users (pedes-
trians and cyclists) and motorized vehicles. Fewer such
encounters will also, other things being equal, lead to
fewer road accidents between vehicles and pedestrians.
If vulnerable road users are unwary of motorized vehi-
cles (risk compensation), the advantageous effect (a re-
duction in road accidents) of fewer cars is reduced. Such
risk compensation will, however, probably not entirely
eliminate the beneficial effect of decreasing the number
of motorized vehicles. An increase of vulnerable road
users in the area, however, can increase conflicts between
cyclists and pedestrians, which might in turn cause more
accidents between such road users. Fortunately, traffic ac-
cidents involving only such users usually result in injuries
of a less serious nature; therefore, an increase in such acci-
dents will unlikely be large enough to remove the positive
impact on road safety of reducing the number of cars.
Winter maintenance should not be neglected just
because motorized traffic is reduced. For example, if foot-
paths are slippery, accidents might rise given possibly
increased pedestrian and cycle traffic due to reduced mo-
torized traffic. For the sake of remaining users, wintermaintenance should therefore not be neglected in the buf-
fer zone.
Vibrant city centre
To ensure that the area around the FGC is vibrant and
that people choose to use the area, it is important that
both regular users and visitors perceive the area as at-
tractive, regardless of gender, age, income, or education.
Offering a variety of entertainment motivates people to
spend time in public spaces. Removing general vehicle
traffic might banish activities that rely on frequent deliv-
eries. However, the buffer zone can also be used to pro-
vide an attractive recreation area, such as a park with a
skate ramp. In addition, buildings on the FGC’s fringe,
such as the old Oslo Public Library, can be redeveloped
as attractions for the greater population. A challenge here
would be to introduce attractions that do not sacrifice
other security requirements, such as protection from in-
telligence gathering, for example, hostile reconnaissance
using binoculars from high buildings.
Summary
Table 2 summarizes both the challenges and the oppor-
tunities connected with introducing a buffer zone with
reduced accessibility for motorized vehicles.
Discussion
This paper has extended the use of the SFF from rela-
tively straightforward products, such as the Grippa Clip
and a railway carriage, to the many-faceted FGC. In
Meyer and Ekblom (2012), the authors assessed the
framework by discussing whether it (1) was clearly ex-
pressed, (2) facilitated creativity, and (3) was practically
applicable. After employing the framework in the FGC of
Norway, this paper’s authors would like to comment on
those three criteria.
Our experience is that the SFF terms were relatively
easy to employ when describing the FGC’s security func-
tion. It was not evident that a framework developed for
straightforward products would also work for such a
many-faceted development, but we had no problems when
describing the security function. This study has thus rein-
forced the claim that the SFF is clearly expressed.
Meyer and Ekblom (2012) concluded, after a short dis-
cussion, that the SFF facilitated structured creativity. In
the current case, the authors identified many of the con-
crete challenges and opportunities before they employed
the SFF, partly since the framework was employed so
late in the investigation. However, the framework forced
the authors to rethink, and to connect the purposes
of the FGC to the challenges and opportunities, and
thereby made the underlying conflicting principles
more evident. The SFF is therefore fertile in the sense that
it structures the argument and clarifies the contact points
Table 2 Outline of challenges and opportunities/solutions
Requirements Challenges Opportunities/solutions
Primary purpose
Space Less space for buildings Building denser
Constructing taller buildings
Functional Deliveries External commodity reception
Reduced accessibility for disabled people Constructing areas that improve inclusive access
Subsidiary purposes
Flexibility Variable distance requirements Flexible barriers
Internal security Emergency vehicle access Multiple access points
Secure access for important visitors Protected access points
Desire requirements
Representative Ugly barriers Constructing barriers that increase the attractiveness of outdoor areas
Social-responsibility requirements
Accessibility General vehicle access Better pedestrian and bicycle access
Deliveries Alternative routes and/or transport by non-motorized vehicles
Public surface transport Increase underground transport
Environmental concerns More environmentally friendly transport
Green outdoor areas
Preservation Less space-efficient use of land
External security Fewer eyes on the street Employing formal surveillance to make other citizens feel safer
Better road safety for the remaining road users
Vibrant city centre Deliveries for attractions Using the buffer zone to create attractions
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tematic approach to gather and systemize the relevant
information.
The FGC is a project that by all appearances will be
realised, and the ideas formulated in this paper could
therefore be further tested during the development and
the building of the FGC. A brief look at Table 2 also
shows that all of the suggested solutions are possible to
realise and could be implemented, given a positive polit-
ical climate. However, one of the main reasons for the
solutions’ feasibility is that they seek to implement stake-
holders’ expressed wishes as revealed during the authors’
comprehensive information collection amongst the stake-
holders. The SFF can therefore aid in clear thinking and
structured creativity, but it cannot compensate for com-
prehensive information collection among different stake-
holders to ascertain their various perspectives by way of
developing solutions that meet their requirements as
much as possible.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, it explores
various trade-offs between standoff and other values,
and, when appropriate, proposes possible solutions to
such dilemmas. Second, it asks whether employing theSFF in the FGC of Norway will help illuminate these
‘troublesome trade-offs’.
The analysis has demonstrated that standoff creates
challenges for other purposes of the FGC, such as func-
tional office spaces for all employees, but many of these
challenges can be solved by planning intelligently, such as
creating an external commodity reception. Standoff also
creates opportunities for reinforcing social-responsibility
requirements, such as accessibility for pedestrians and
environmental considerations. The current literature has
mostly focused on negative externalities of security, while
this paper demonstrates that security measures can have
both negative and positive externalities and that planning
might alleviate some of the negative ones. The results, fur-
thermore, support Little’s (2004) notion about thinking
holistically about protection to create robust and effective
security, and show that the academic community can as-
sist in such holistic thinking.
The discussion showed that the SFF is expressed in
terms that also can be employed in the multifaceted
FGC of Norway. The framework, furthermore, forced
the authors to rethink and connect the purposes of the
FGC to the challenges and opportunities and made the
underlying conflicting principles more evident. The solu-
tions proposed through this process were also practically
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feasibility was probably the comprehensive information
collection prior to employing the framework.
This paper focuses on one measure, standoff, and explores
the trade-offs between employing standoff and other
purposes/values. All the dilemmas mentioned are therefore
two-dimensional. Such dilemmas might, however, have even
more than two dimensions. For example, Berntsen et al.
(2014) have shown that some trade-offs have three dimen-
sions, such as, for the FGC of Norway, the trade-off between
enough office space, standoff, and preservation. Such
trade-offs should be explored further, including the
three-dimensional trade-off between functional office
space, environmental requirements and security measures.
Another direction for future research would be to apply
the SFF to protecting even more complex ‘products’.
Could we extend this framework to protecting other areas,
such as a park, a neighbourhood, or even a city centre?
Endnotes
aAnother relevant case is Oklahoma City, the capital
of the U.S. state Oklahoma.
bThe map is owned by the City of Oslo, Agency for
Planning and Building Services, and has been down-
loaded from http://www.planinnsyn.oslo.no/.
cIn this discussion the FGC is treated as a unit situated
in the habitat of the wider environment of Oslo City and
occupies particular security niches. One could also treat
the FGC as a habitat within which smaller-scale entities,
for example, specific buildings, have particular security
functions and occupy niches within the complex.
dEVIL DONE summarizes the main properties of the
targets that terrorists choose: Exposed, Vital, Iconic, Le-
gitimate, Destructible, Occupied, Near and Easy (Clarke
and Newman, 2006).
eSuch standoff arrangements can be (and have been)
compromised if important persons expect to be taken
right up to the door in their vehicles and the managers
of the complex fail to resist their demands.
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